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1. Introduction 
Let me start by thanking the organizers for giving me the opportunity to talk here today. 
When we originally decided on the topic, this was some time before the current melt-
down started. Still, at least from the beginning of 2007, the troubles in the US subprime 
market were already visible. And it was evident that this would cause collateral damage 
around the world. This focused international attention on the area of retail finance – an 
area that typically receives much less attention than the fancier world of wholesale 
finance.
Recent events, however, have shifted attention back towards the wholesale end, such as 
the markets for asset-backed securities and credit default swaps. This conference is thus 
particularly timely in turning our attention once again to where the problem started, the 
retail side. 
Initially, the plan of this talk was to give a first view on the research that is currently 
undertaken at the Institute of Monetary and Financial Stability in Frankfurt. At this 
institute, we now operate a “competence center” on retail finance, co-financed by an 
Advanced ERC grant from the European Union. Our core topic is the regulation of 
retail finance, in particular from an European perspective. Some results from this 
ongoing research will show up during my talk, but I have decided to somewhat shift the 
focus towards more pressing issues. 
Despite this shift in focus, I am confident that there will be little overlap with other 
keynote speakers or panelists. This is so for two reasons. First, much of my talk will 
stay in the world of academics, relating to models and academic literature. Second, I 
suspect that my perspective on policy is different. 
I certainly agree that currently there is an urgent need to act decisively. But from a 
retail perspective, which for me means putting consumer welfare at center stage, some 
of the measures that are implemented to shore up financial stability may have dire 
consequences.
The virtues of competition seem to be forgotten by those who see the future in having 
few, large universal banks, probably with captive retail clients, to whom they sell their 
own investment and credit products. They are also willing to wave through mergers that 
will significantly reduce retail competition in the future. 2
The virtues of competition are to bring down prices and to spur innovation. Some argue 
that credit to households was too readily available and too cheap. Others argue that 
there was too much innovation. Having worked on competition cases in a range of 
industries, to me these are certainly novel and “original” views. I will argue that once a 
system to adequately protect retail customers is in place, there is little or even no merit 
in these views.
In the first part of my talk, I will speak more generally about the “supply side” in retail 
finance. This has, to my view, been largely neglected by academics. We thus have very 
little knowledge of how product and process innovations have changed the way 
households borrow, save and invest. We also lack models and data to make a 
compelling case for how to optimally regulate the industry, thereby protecting 
customers and allowing competition to work. In the second part of my talk, I will turn 
in detail to the topics of innovation and regulation, and their interaction. In the final 
part, I will return to recent events and the long-term policy issues that they raise. 
2. The Neglected Supply Side 
Households’ financial decisions have increasingly attracted the attention of academics. 
Key drivers of this increased interest are profound changes to households’ personal 
balance sheets: they became longer, as homes substantially increased in value; on the 
asset side, expected payouts from pay-as-you-go pension schemes were replaced by 
contributions to pillar II or pillar III pension schemes; and on the liability side, we 
witnessed, at least in some countries, a massive increase in secured and unsecured debt. 
There is no space here to discuss the various approaches taken to explain the increase in 
household debt. At least for someone coming more from the micro side, the lack of 
supply-side arguments is surprising. In fact, the supply side is mostly reduced to perfect 
competition – or, likewise, a dynamic programming equation, maximizing a 
representative household’s discounted utility. This is despite the fact that the respective 
markets underwent profound changes, such as the use of ever more sophisticated 
scoring models or increased competition from distant lenders. 
This is all hard to integrate in a framework that already assumes perfect competition. 
The same applies to the role of financial innovations. 
Next, the area of household finance has made advances in documenting and explaining 
household portfolio choice, as well as integrating it into models of asset pricing. 
Research on this frontier is driven by puzzles, such as low stock market participation, 
underdiversification or, on the credit side, the sluggish refinancing behavior of 
mortgage holders.
1 This also brings in the growing literature on behavioral finance, 
which documents further “biases”, at least among some investors, such as 
overconfidence.
2
1 E.g., Campbell (2006). 
2 E.g., Odean (1999). 3
Again, in my view the role of the supply side has been largely neglected. Households 
may often choose only among those products that they are offered by their main bank 
or financial advisor. The choice set, in turn, has become wider due to a scaling back of 
regulation, more competition and financial innovation—all themes to which I return 
later. 
The supply side may also shed more light on cross-country differences in borrowing, 
saving and investment. This is obvious given different regulatory regimes or different 
degrees of financial literacy. Differences in the organization of the industry should also 
play a major role. At one extreme, a large bank may distribute only its own products to 
unsophisticated and captive clients. At the other extreme, untied financial advisors may 
tap into a variety of products, offered by a wide range of providers. This also requires 
to factor in the role of financial planners and other experts that assist retail clients—
such as the role of self-interested mortgage brokers, working on up-front commissions. 
In a nutshell, in my view cross-country differences, as well as shifts over time, may 
find so far unexplored first-order explanations on the supply side.
3. Too much Innovation? 
Such a re-focusing on the supply side leads directly to the issue of innovation. Did 
financial innovation get us into the current mess? Clearly, not every innovation is a 
good thing for society. A large literature in Industrial Organization speaks to the 
question of whether we should expect too much or too little innovation. I find it 
worthwhile to remind us of one simple point. Under imperfect competition, an 
innovator will typically not pass-on to customers all advantages that arise from an 
innovation. In this case, there is thus a powerful first-order argument for why there will 
be too little innovation. Why should the case of financial services be different? 
Even without talking about “weapons of mass destruction” in the disguise of new 
financial products, one could agree with Miller (1986): “The major impulses to 
successful innovations over the past 20 years have come, I am saddened to have to say, 
from regulation and taxes”. Still, financial innovations arguably complete the market, 
address agency concerns and information asymmetries, minimize transaction costs, or 
respond to new risk factors or new technological developments.
3 There are abundant 
examples in retail finance, including the distribution of exchange-traded funds, the 
introduction of internet banking, or process innovations such as credit scoring.
4
Often, shifts are more gradual, as in the case of mortgages. A key part of the innovative 
process is that firms experiment with the marketing of well-known products.
5 But this 
3 See Tufano (2002) or Merton (1992) for a more detailed discussion. 
4 E.g., Frame and White (2002). 
5 A consequence is that shifts across countries are not homogeneous. For instance, fixed-rate 
contracts have picked up in some European countries, as in the UK, while variable-rate 
contracts have become more common in others, as in Denmark. See Miles and Pillonca (2007). 4
shall not suggest that every newly introduced contract was to the benefits of 
customers—a theme to which I return later.
6 For instance, “endowment” or “savings 
and equity” mortgages may offer tax advantages to some households. But other 
households may have simply underestimated the risk of the bundled-in equity-
investment plan. 
On the other hand, however, there may still be plenty of scope for beneficial 
innovations. For instance, a roll-out of fairly-priced reverse mortgages could potentially 
benefit many aging households.
7 Also, the further development of credit scoring will 
continue to reduce transaction costs and to facilitate entry into local markets, bringing 
down interest rates and broadening access to loans.
8 For the US, various studies indeed 
find that the market for borrowing has become more perfect, as measured by reduced 
volatility of consumer spending or a closer alignment of consumption and long-term 
income prospects.
9
But who are the main innovators? While this is a key theme in Industrial Organization, 
the literature on retail finance is thin. Earlier studies suggest that size is important, in 
particular for the introduction and roll-out of new services.
10 More recent studies 
suggest, however, that smaller firms are more innovative.
11 According to a recent study 
that exploits articles from the business press, the by far most innovative firm in the US 
was Merrill Lynch. 
This brings to mind the following well-known story. (In-)famously, in 1977, it was also 
Merrill Lynch that invented the Cash Management Account, in effect allowing non-
banks to circumvent the equally infamous Regulation-Q. As most will know, this 
regulation capped deposit rates and forebade banks from paying interest on checking 
deposits. The market’s innovations forced regulators to phase-out Regulation Q and to 
override state usury ceilings.
12
The benefits that this innovation brought to ordinary savers should be obvious. On the 
other hand, it has been argued that this contributed towards the ultimate demise of the 
Savings and Loan industry. I will return later to this, often only perceived, trade-off 
between competition and innovation on the one hand and financial stability on the other 
hand.
6 E.g.,  Scanion and Whitehead (2004). 
7 Furthermore, in the absence of inflation indexing, once inflation picks up, many mortgages 
may have an excessively skewed repayment profile, in terms of “front end loading”.E.g., 
Campbell and Cocco (2003). 
8 DeYoung et al. (2008), for instance, document this for small business lending, where the form 
of borrowing is similar to that of unsecured household loans. 
9 E.g., Gerardi et al. (2007) or Dynan et al. (2006). 
10 E.g., Frame and Wright (2002) and Tufano (2002). 
11 See Lerner (2007). 
12 E.g., Gilbert (1986) and Cocheo (2003). 5
Overall, in my view the first presumption on retail financial innovation is that it 
increases consumer welfare and that it is a manifestation of working competition. In the 
words of the EU Commissioner Charlie McCreevy, who spoke on financial innovation 
in 2005: “I welcome this innovation.” The Commissioner, however, also made clear 
that, at the retail side, innovation must be supported by an adequate regulatory 
framework to protect borrowers, savers and investors. This is the topic of the next part. 
4. Regulating Retail Finance 
The need to prosecute misrepresentation of information is obvious. With retail financial 
products, however, a far heavier burden must be placed on the seller. The principle of 
“caveat emptor” is wholly insufficient, at least when a client is either advised or can 
reasonably expect to obtain advice. In these cases, sellers and advisors must share 
responsibility for the suitability of a product.
13
There is a long list of cases of alleged or proven “misselling” in various European 
countries, ranging from new technology stocks in Germany to pension products in the 
UK. Sharing similar problems is, however, not a sufficient prerequisite for harmonizing 
regulatory approaches across Europe—a theme to which I later return in detail. The 
current crisis may unearth further incidences of misselling. For instance, the retail 
buyers of structured investment products in Germany or Switzerland, where these 
markets are large, may not have been aware of two major problems with these products. 
First, counterparty risk: Papers issued by Lehman Brothers did not only involve a bet 
on, say, various stock market indices, but also a bet on the likelihood of Lehman’s 
default. Second, trading is illiquid and was indeed often halted over the last months. 
From a financial stability perspective, this may all be peanuts, compared to the 
problems on the wholesale markets. It should, however, not be forgotten that such 
incidences seriously undermine the public’s trust in the financial system. 
At this point, I would like to spend some time walking you through the basics of a 
model on misselling and financial advice. The key departure of this model from the 
earlier literature on credence goods and advice is that it introduces an internal agency 
problem. That is, the firm has to ensure also internal compliance. This not only adds 
realism. It also generates a number of additional policy recommendations. 
For model presentation: SeePowerpoint slide.
14
13 In such a market for “credence goods”, this is also in the self-interest of business, as 
documented by the respective requirements of self-regulatory bodies. For instance, the National 
Association of Security Dealers (NASD) requires that prior to making a recommendation to a 
non-institutional customer, a member must make reasonable efforts to obtain information about 
the customer’s background. (In 2007 NASD was merged with the enforcement arm of the 
NYSE to form FINRA.) 
14 For details see Inderst and Ottaviani (2008). 6
A corollary of these observations is that a drive towards harmonizing European 
regulation in the area of retail finance may have serious drawbacks. Both the demand 
side, such as financial literacy, and the supply side, such as the organization of 
distribution systems, still differ widely. With a standardized approach, the fine-tuning 
of regulation that I have just described would thus not work.
Admittedly, the harmonization of consumer protection and regulation may stimulate 
cross-border competition. This seems to be the guiding principle behind the 
introduction of a single European passport for securities and investment companies. 
However, taking the perspective of retail customers, the creation of a single European 
market can not be an end in itself. 
The Commission’s drive to harmonize mortgage regulation has now lost steam, as 
mortgages have been excluded from the new consumer credit directive. Earlier 
proposals planned the introduction of a statutory right of prepayment, despite 
considerable contractual differences among European countries. 
Evidently, contractual restrictions on the prepayment of mortgages can serve to 
optimally allocate interest rate risk between the borrower and the lender. The large 
literature on “endogenous switching costs” has shown that such forms of contractual 
lock-in are not necessarily a sign of weak competition. Nor do they necessarily dampen 
competition. Furthermore, in terms of consumer protection alone, the assessment is at 
best ambivalent. Simple models from behavioral economics suggest that prepayment 
clauses can lead to a cross-subsidization of more sophisticated customers at the costs of 
those who are more naïve. 
In sum, I currently do not see a thorough economic underpinning of the Commission’s 
various policy proposals in retail finance. I would hope that when it comes to consumer 
protection and, in particular, retail finance, the example of European competition policy 
could be followed. There, the Commission leads much of the rest of Europe in the 
application of solid economic modeling and empirical analysis.
5. Where Are We Heading Now? 
For the final part of my talk, let me return to current events, albeit drawing on the 
previous remarks. I will not discuss the pros and cons of various short-term firefighting 
measures of central banks, regulators and policy makers. I worry, instead, about those 
measures that will stick. Many academics worry that current precedents will have 
serious implications for future moral hazard. I will also not address this issue. Instead, I 
worry that future competition will be seriously undermined.
Universal banks are clearly on the ascendant. Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch found 
shelter with two large universal banks. What remains of Lehman is being picked up by 
Barclays. Other universal banks, such as Citigroup, have switched from modesty after 
massive destruction of shareholder value to boldness, picking up what seem to be 
undervalued assets. Big is beautiful, particularly if you are too big to fail. The argument 
of being “too big too fail” will ring much truer next time when a crisis hits. I do not 
have to spell out the implications that this has for moral hazard and thus stability. 7
While investment banking will automatically be under closer regulatory scrutiny, once 
it is in the fold of a commercial bank, will it become less risky? Are we sure that Basle 
II will exclude all possible loopholes that were so excessively used under Basle I, 
allowing banks to hide and dislocate risk? May not stable earnings from the retail side 
and the access to a broad deposit base induce more risk taking? As a piece of evidence, 
commercial banks that expand into investment banking seem to adopt pay-performance 
compensation systems similar to investment banks. In particular, the pay-performance 
sensitivity of their CEO increases.
15
Risky investment banking in the shadow of or, more precisely, at the back of a bank’s 
broad retail business: Why should this make those concerned about consumer welfare 
and financial stability happy? What is more, turning back to the issue of innovation, 
how innovative are large, incumbent universal banks in contrast to leaner, more focused 
investment banks? My previous observations suggest that we should be rather 
pessimistic than optimistic. 
After two decades of preaching core competencies, has the pendulum swung back 
towards seeing beauty in oversized and diversified conglomerates? Criticism on the role 
of external capital markets suggest that this change of mood is not confined to banking 
alone. Conglomerates and family firms, which often operate a diversified pool of 
operations, again find favor among practitioners and academics. Another fad that bank 
regulation could risk following? 
A more immediate threat to competition comes from state intervention and state aid, as 
well as growing consolidation. I will only speak to the latter point. Take the case of the 
tie-up between HBOS and Lloyds’. HBOS is the UK's biggest mortgage lender, writing 
one in five of all new home loans, while Lloyds’ is the third biggest lender overall. The 
two groups would end up having a combined mortgage book of, at first count, three 
times the size of the next biggest rival, Nationwide. HBOS is also the biggest savings 
provider, while Lloyds’ is the third largest. 
The tie-up must also be seen against the following background. Recent independent 
inquiries into the UK’s banking market as well as decisions by the UK’s Competition 
Commission all shared one view: Further consolidation should not be permitted, even 
under wide-ranging remedies.
16 To my knowledge, for the merger of HBOS and 
Lloyds’ no remedies, such as the disposal of branches, has been agreed, and no future 
consideration of such remedies is planned. 
It also remains to be seen how far the hands of DG Comp will be tied in the case of 
Fortis. Will the Dutch government comply with the remedies that the Commission 
imposed when it agreed on the way ABN Amro was sliced up by RBC, Santander and 
Fortis only one and a half year ago? 
15 E.g., Fields and Fraser (1999). 
16 The Cruickshank report in 2000 urged the government to put a stop on the further 
consolidation of the industry. The Competition Commission stopped, for instance, the proposed 
merger of Lloyds and Abbey National. 8
It is, however, not only market consolidation per se that I worry about, having retail 
customers in mind. Instead, when regulators as well as customers misguidedly see too 
much virtue in firms that are large, supposedly stable and familiar to them, then this has 
far-reaching implications for the whole financial architecture. Third-party providers 
may have little chance to survive, let alone to grow, when banks’ captive customers fail 
to shop or, likewise, when branch managers need not compete with attractive offers.
In short, I fear that once the dust settles, the current crisis will leave us with a financial 
system that delivers less for retail clients, in terms of prices, services and innovations. 
6. Rethinking and Reforming Policy Responses to Retail Finance 
I doubt whether the aforementioned developments and measures that threaten 
competition are indeed unavoidable and necessary to stabilize the financial system. My 
fear is that policy is too short-sighted. My fear is also that retail customers’ long-term 
interests are simply ignored. But once the firefighting is done, the present crisis would 
provide an opportunity to rethink the scale and shape of the retail finance market. 
This market has and will be deeply influenced by public policy. The case of the US 
subprime mortgage market is an obvious example. Another example is that of tax-
advantaged savings and pension products. In both cases we have to ask whether 
households can handle the decisions that governments and the market increasingly 
impose on them, say through privatizing the pension system. 
In terms of retirement savings, there could be benefits in favoring simple, reliable 
products with very low administrative costs. Customers should still be able to opt-out 
from those. But sellers would have to document any advice in this direction, say 
through a filed letter of suitability. This is just one example of a policy that would 
reduce the need for further regulation and supervision. 
Preaching the virtues of competition, as I am doing today, does not exclude a rethinking 
of the role of government—say, the role as an intermediary that the government could 
successfully play in the case of a pay-as-you-go pension system. Also, where 
households can or must make financial decisions, a set of rules and principles is 
necessary to protect, in particular, the most unsophisticated households. There is no 
time left to talk in detail about these rules, let alone about a complementary program to 
gear up households’ financial literacy. Given adequate rules and supervision, it is, 
however, competition that provides the best protection for informed consumers. 
Banking is here no exception. 
Admittedly, a long tradition in the theory of banking argues that more competition 
leads to more risk taking and thus higher default risk. More recent work qualifies this 
view, both theoretically and empirically.
17 Moreover, in cases where such a negative 
trade-off between competition and stability exists, policy and supervision are first 
17 On the theoretical side, see Inderst et al. (2008). On the empirical side, see Boyd et al. 
(2006).9
blame: either because regulation and government intervention created exploitable 
situations in the first place; or because supervision did not react flexibly enough. 
Still, at least a perceived trade-off may sometimes remain. Though this may at first 
seem odd, I feel that it is exactly in times like these that we need reminding of the 
virtues of competition to deliver value to households. To take the supply-side view to 
retail finance is thus not only an academic program. Applied to policy, to me it means 
to put consumer welfare first and thus to preserve a competitive financial architecture.
Thank you for your attention! 
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